My research study focuses on strengthening trust and cooperation between the Central and State Governments in India, counterterrorism efforts. Article 1 of the Indian Constitution establishes the union of all states and Union Territories. Articles 3 and 4 indicate that the
Central Government has the authority to modify or adjust state territories, while Article 360 allows for changes to the federal structure during financial emergencies. A significant part of my research involves understanding the scope of Article 355, which grants the Central Government the power to protect states from foreign aggression and intervene in state affairs, impacting their autonomy. The Kuldip Nayar v. UOI case establishes that federalism is about the distribution of power between the Central and State Governments, rather than territorial connections. Article 245 empowers Parliament to make laws extending beyond the nation’s boundaries, while state legislatures can pass laws within their own jurisdictions. This section will specifically cover the Mumbai Terror Attacks, where, despite receiving alerts from the Central Government, the state government failed to take appropriate action, as highlighted by a High-Level Enquiry Committee. The High-Level Enquiry Committee (HLEC) report, which was sent to the Maharashtra government, has not been made public along with the Maharashtra Home Department report. Instead, it was only delivered to the DGP and the anti-terrorist unit. There is ambiguity regarding the marine authority of the Mumbai Police and the Indian Navy. This raises the question of how to address federalism issues, especially when there are frequent disagreements between the federal and state governments. To resolve the marine authority issue, I propose implementing clear regulations and defining the roles of states so they do not feel that the federal government is overstepping. The Sarbananda Sonowal v. UOI case, which struck down the IMDT Act, is relevant here. According to the Foreigners Act, the responsibility of proving an individual’s illegal immigration status lies with the state, a requirement applicable throughout India. If Article 355 empowers the federal government to protect the states, how can their roles be reversed? The court clarified the general power of the federal government, but this ruling faced criticism for lacking mechanisms for accountability. Following the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, the Central Government established the National Counter Terrorism Centre, granting it significant authority. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) now has powers equivalent to those of state police under the National Investigation Agency (Amendment) Act, 2019. My research will primarily focus on the challenges faced by states and Union Territories in combating terrorism without solely depending on the NIA. The Government of India Act of 1935 introduced the concept of federalism in India, although the definition of federalism itself is not universally agreed upon. According to the Royal Commission on Australian Federation, it is a system where political power is divided between central and local governments, each independent within its domain. Freeman views federalism as a division of authority where the centre and states work within their limits without interfering with each other. Technically, India is a union of states, and the Union government holds significant power to represent the nation and maintain peace. The Indian Constitution empowers the Union Government to provide directives to the states. However, if a state refuses to follow these directives, the Union has the authority to intervene and directly manage the state, particularly under Article 356 . The question arises whether the states are gradually losing their power to the Union. In the case of SR Bommai , the court clarified that while the Union holds greater power, states are not merely subordinates; they retain paramount authority within their own sphere. In Kuldip Nayar’s case, the court emphasized that federalism in India focuses on the division of powers between the Union and the states, with a unitary bias. This bias is apparent in the structure of India’s federal system, where the Rajya Sabha represents party interests rather than state interests, suggesting a more centrist model. Article 355 of the Constitution obligates the Union government to protect states from both internal and external threats, which includes the duty to ensure that state governments function according to the Constitution. The Union has the authority to intervene in cases of disorder, as seen in the case of the Naga People’s Movement, where the Armed Forces Special Powers Act was upheld. This law allows the Union to deploy armed forces in disturbed areas to prevent domestic unrest and avoid the need for extreme measures under Article 356. The case of H. S. Jain v Union of India 17 further clarified that the Union’s responsibility under Article 355 ensures state governments adhere to constitutional norms, thereby allowing the Union to act if a state fails to do so. The Mumbai terror attacks highlighted the failure of state agencies to manage such threats despite receiving intelligence warnings from the centre, stressing the need for effective cooperation between the Union and the states for improved security. Article 355 is an emergency provision 18 , and its misuse could undermine federalism. The case in Manipur raised questions about the covert implementation of Article 355 without formal notification, suggesting that arbitrary use could be unconstitutional. The Sarbanda Sonowal case, dealing with illegal immigration in Assam, illustrated that the Union’s duty under Article 355 includes safeguarding states from external aggression, such as illegal immigration, and that failure to do so could violate constitutional principles. Post-2008 Mumbai attacks, the creation of national agencies like the NIA exemplifies the Union’s overarching powers in matters of national security, bypassing state jurisdiction in counter-terrorism efforts. However, some states have resisted this centralization, arguing that the Union’s powers under Article 355 infringe on their rights to manage local law enforcement, especially in matters relating to police functions. The issue of central versus state jurisdiction in counter-terrorism efforts highlights the need for a balanced approach, especially with agencies like the National Investigation Agency (NIA) and the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC). While the Bombay High Court recognized the role of the NIA alongside state agencies, concerns about the central government overstepping its authority and the potential abuse of power cannot be overlooked. A harmonious approach between union and state powers is essential, ensuring that states maintain their autonomy while the central government addresses national security threats effectively. The implementation of counter-terrorism measures across India’s diverse states presents challenges, particularly given resource constraints and variations in expertise. States may lack the necessary capacity to handle sensitive data or manage security operations on their own, which may necessitate dependence on central agencies like the NIA. This reliance, however, should be introduced gradually, with careful consideration of states; concerns about losing control over local security matters. The concept of Cooperative Federalism, as proposed by Granville Austin, offers a potential solution. It emphasizes collaboration between the central and state governments, allowing for the effective exchange of information and resources while respecting the constitutional rights and autonomy of states. To foster this collaboration, it is vital to enhance the trust and institutional mechanisms between the Centre and the states, as well as to allocate more technical and financial resources to state governments. In the context of the CBI and NIA, the challenges of cooperation between central and state agencies have been evident, with some states withdrawing consent for the CBI due to concerns about political misuse. Despite these challenges, any policy aimed at improving cooperation will only succeed if the Centre can address the fears of the states and build their confidence. The centralization of power in counter-terrorism efforts, such as seen in the Tamil Nadu government transfer of an investigation to the NIA after a bombing incident, underscores the potential drawbacks of over-centralization. The state decision to withdraw its investigation could undermine its police forces effectiveness and hinder the overall security response. As demonstrated by previous cases, the key to successful counter-terrorism strategies lies in the coordination, cooperation, and collaboration between the Centre and the states. While there are concerns about the encroachment on state jurisdiction and civil liberties, a gradual implementation of central measures, along with the strengthening of state capabilities, could improve India’s counter-terrorism response. Transparency, accountability, and parliamentary oversight must be incorporated into the functioning of these agencies to prevent misuse of power. Ultimately, the fight against terrorism requires a collaborative approach that balances the need for effective security measures with the protection of federal principles and citizens rights.
CONCLUSION
India’s counter-terrorism strategy requires a thoughtful approach to balancing the central and state powers. While national agencies such as the National Investigation Agency (NIA) are crucial in tackling the complex and evolving threat of terrorism, the success of these national efforts depends on effective collaboration with state governments. States, with their local knowledge and ability to address region-specific challenges, are integral to ensuring the success of counter-terrorism efforts. The concept of Cooperative Federalism offers a promising solution, as it promotes collaboration between the Centre and states while respecting the constitutional autonomy of
states. This model allows national security efforts to be more inclusive and adaptable to the diverse challenges each state faces. However, for it to succeed, the Centre must assure states that their powers will not be infringed upon or exploited for political gain. Addressing concerns about central overreach is crucial in maintaining state cooperation and trust. The success of counter-terrorism strategies also depends on strengthening the institutional capacity of both the Centre and states. Central agencies must collaborate with state law enforcement and intelligence agencies, providing resources, training, and support to enhance state capabilities. In turn, states must be empowered to address their security concerns, with the autonomy and tools necessary to respond effectively. This collaboration is essential to meet the evolving nature of terrorism. Moreover, ensuring transparency, accountability, and strong parliamentary oversight is vital to prevent the abuse of power and protect civil liberties. While national security is a primary concern, the protection of citizens’ rights must be equally prioritized in a democratic setup. In the end, effective counter-terrorism relies on a balanced, cooperative approach between the Centre and states. A decentralized model, which respects both the national security needs and
state autonomy, is the most effective way forward. By maintaining a careful balance between centralization and decentralization, India can create a resilient and inclusive counter-terrorism framework that secures national borders while preserving the principles of federalism,
democracy, and individual freedoms. This integrated strategy will not only protect India’s security but also strengthen its democratic values, ensuring that counter-terrorism measures are both effective and just.
This article was authored by Zigyasa Mishra, who was the top 40 scorer in the ADR quiz competition organized by Lets Learn Law.